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Abstract

I investigate the effect of the change in call loan rates on stock returns during 1929.
Call loan rates are the interest rates on borrowed funds to trade equity on a given exchange.
It is estimated that 40% of stocks during this period were bought on margin. After a price
decline comes a margin call, followed by a forced sales of securities, which leads to
additional margin calls and future price declines. I regress daily excess returns on the
change in daily call loan rates during 1929. In addition, I estimate volatility using an ARCH
model and observe the previously understood negative relationship between volatility and
stock prices. I find a statistically significant negative relationship between call loan rates
and stock returns. Furthermore, I also find that changes in call loan rates are most
influential on the manufacturing sector relative to the other 11 industries tested.
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1. Introduction
A frequently debated hypothesis posits that reducing the percentage of borrowed
funds used to finance stock positions (margin requirements). A heavily contested and
controversial view, the use of margin requirements to control stock return volatility and
returns has been used as the primary rationale behind the Federal Reserve (Fed)’s initial
use of the policy. Hardouvelis (1988) sets the precedent for future debate on the subject by
finding that historical evidence supports the proposition that margin requirements reduce
stock return volatility. This was a widely held view prior to Hardouvelis (1988) but
Hardouvelis gained notoriety because he was one of the first to perform an empirical test
explaining the validity of this view.
The majority of later papers in the subject including those of Kupiec (1989),
Salinger (1989), and Hsieh and Miller (1990) showed through different reasoning that
Hardouvelis (1988)’s result was erroneous because of incorrect empirical techniques. The
most commonly cited issue was Hardouvelis (1988)’s use of a 12-month moving standard
deviation which is only a backward looking measure, not a forward looking one. All of the
authors adjusted their own tests by either using different measures for volatility such as the
General Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) or replicating
Hardouvelis (1988)’s study for different sample periods. All found that there is no
meaningful relationship between margin requirements and volatility or stock returns.
Hardouvelis (1990) accounted for this criticism by adjusting his model to use a
different monthly measure for volatility and found the same statistically significant marginvolatility relationship as his 1988 paper. Hsieh and Miller (1990) further criticized this
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measure by arguing that Hardouvelis (1988, 1990) should have taken differences in
variables, not levels. They corrected for this apparent misspecification and found no
significant result. Hardouvelis and Theodossiou (2002) disputed Hsieh and Miller (1990)’s
criticism by arguing that volatility and margin requirements are stationary and thus taking
differences in the variables is incorrect.
In summary, the majority of the previous literature concludes that there is no
significant relationship between changing the margin requirement and that change’s impact
on volatility or stock returns. Although it should be noted that there is considerable
reference to Hardouvelis’s findings and controversy over the validity of his methodology
and results.
This paper takes a step away from the existing debate about margin requirements
by focusing on a variable that has been discussed in the literature but only from a theoretical
perspective as a perceived influence on stock prices: the call loan rate. The debate on
margin requirements and the lack of consensus in the literature is important to discuss for
two reasons. The first is that it points to an abundance of discussion about the validity of
an important monetary policy. The second is that the debate highlights an apparent lack of
discussion on a highly related topic that may have an influence on stock prices. Therefore,
the purpose of this paper is to discuss the importance of this variable and empirically test
the change in call loan rates’ effect on total stock market and industry returns.
Margin trading plays a significant role in financial markets because it gives
investors an ability to invest a larger amount in marginable securities than they otherwise
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would be able to using cash. 1 This is important because many investors use it to boost
returns above and beyond what they could have done without the use of margin.
I began my analysis by collecting daily data of call loan rates in 1929. This data
lies in the historical section of the New York Times. I chose 1929 for several reasons. The
first is that the Great Depression is widely understood as the most significant financial
crisis to date and being able to empirically explain the dramatic fall in prices would
constitute a significant contribution to the literature. The second is that various metrics
indicated that borrowing costs were low during the latter half of 1929 when the market
crashed. For example, traditional margin requirements were low during this period,
becoming as low as 10%. 2 Broker loan volume was high at a time when money rates were
low on October 3rd where the rate dropped to 6% from 7.5% the day before. 3 Furthermore,
a large fraction (around 40%) of stocks were being bought on margin. 4 Thirdly, margin
requirements were not regulated by the Fed like they are today. Instead, brokers controlled
these loans and set the price according to their own interests which likely contributed to
the low interest rate associated with borrowing. Brokers profit as the number of loans they
give out increases.
Factors explaining the low barrier to trading on credit is important for this topic
because the call loan rate is a short term interest rate which was the principal rate brokers
borrowed at. This low rate quantified the ease with which shares on margin could be

1

Randy Frederick, Charles Schwab, February 08, 2018: This percentage generally differs by broker.
Modern margin agreements allow for borrowing up to 50% of the purchase price of marginable securities.
2
1929: The Great Crash, a BBC documentary, October 29, 2009
3
Financial times, October 4, 1929
4
Entangled Political Economy: Roger Koppl, Steven Horowitz, Page 142, October 3, 2014
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purchased for brokers’ clients. Finally, 1929 is useful because there is ample variation in
the call loan rate which is valuable for econometric analyses.
I collected daily stock return data from Ken French’s website in addition to returns
on Fama and French (1993)’s SMB and HML factors used to explain variation in returns.
I also collected returns data on 12 industries. To avoid the problems mentioned by Hsieh
and Miller (1990) and others regarding Hardouvelis (1988, 1990)’s measure of volatility,
I used an Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity one lag model [ARCH (1)] to
determine daily volatility. Black (1976) and Christie (1982) showed that there is a negative
relationship between volatility and stock prices. This occurs because as stock prices fall,
the firm becomes more levered due to an inherent adjustment in the percentage of debt in
a firm’s capital structure. 5 Leverage makes cash flows riskier to equity holders which raises
the required return on equity (ROE) and volatility of stock returns. An alternate explanation
for Black (1976)’s finding is that high market volatility means that stocks are relatively
risky when compared to other riskless instruments like treasury bills and hence demand a
higher risk premium. This implies that upward movements in volatility (assuming that
volatility is expected to remain high for some time) would lead to lower stock prices and
hence negative returns. For these reasons, I expected the coefficient on volatility to be
negative and statistically significant for the regression specifications which I ran and which
are explained in more detail later in this paper.
I ran six different regression specifications in order to determine the effect of a
change in the call loan rate on stock returns. I began by regressing daily returns from 1929

5

In company financial statements, Debt is denoted in book value, whereas references to capital structure
generally assume book value of debt and market value of equity.
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on the percentage change in call loan rates. I then included daily volatility as an additional
explanatory variable. I also regressed industry excess returns on excess market returns and
the change in the call loan rate. I then added in volatility as an explanatory variable. My
final two specifications mimic the 3rd and 4th specifications except that they include the
Fama-French SMB and HML factors.
I found a statistically significant negative relationship between the change in call
loan rates and total stock market returns during 1929. The coefficient on calldiffpct in the
first specification is -1.653 and the coefficient changes to -1.609 upon the introduction of
volatility into the regression. Volatility has a statistically significant coefficient of -0.614.
Specifically, a one standard deviation move of 0.18% in the call loan rate difference in
percentage results in 0.299% drop in stock returns. When including market volatility as an
explanatory variable, I found that a one standard deviation change in call loan rates results
in a 0.291% drop in stock returns. A one standard deviation move in the change in volatility
as a percentage of roughly 0.6% reduces daily stock returns by 0.37%.
After looking at the broader market, I looked at the effect of the change in call loan
rates on 12 different industries in order to understand whether this effect is different across
industries. I found that in each industry specification, the only industry with a negative and
statistically significant coefficient is manufacturing with a coefficient ranging from -0.362
to -0.450 depending on the specification. A one standard deviation move of 0.18% in the
call loan rate with a coefficient of -0.362 when including the market, volatility, and the
Fama-French factors results in a 0.065% reduction in daily returns for the manufacturing
industry. A one standard deviation change in the volatility of manufacturing returns of
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0.6% and a coefficient on volatility of 0.253 increases daily returns by 0.15%. Besides the
consistency of manufacturing in providing statistically significant results, the lack of
significance of call loan rates and volatility on other industry returns might imply that the
effects of the call loan rate were quite similar across industries, further suggesting that
perhaps stocks in most industries were purchased on margin to roughly the same extent.
For the rest of the paper, I analyze prior literature on the subject and commented on
what contribution this paper makes to the current literature. The literature highlights an
important trend in the view of how important borrowing restrictions are to understanding
stock returns. I continue the discussion by describing how I run my empirical tests by
outlining the data used and how the regressions were constructed. I then explain my results
and conclude by discussing these results and their relevance for future research.
2. Literature Review
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 gave the Federal Reserve the authority to
set the minimum margin requirement for brokers, dealers, and lenders at the time of
purchase. 6 This meant that the margin requirements were no longer market determined and
subsequently saw an increase from their 1929 levels.
The crash of 1929 is of particular interest because of the lack of empirical studies
done on the effect of changes in call loan rates on daily stock returns. White (1990)
discussed the causes of the Great Depression and cited a plethora of reasons behind the
crash including Galbraith (1954)’s mania hypothesis, the new economy and the stock

6

SEC.gov – SEC Act of 1934
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market of the 1920s, the role of fundamentals in the bull market of the 1920s, and credit
and the stock market boom. Galbraith (1954)’s conventional wisdom focused on the
irrationality behind the bubble. He argued that it was a feeling of jubilation among the
general public and a view that positive returns would be perpetual which drove up prices.
Both Galbraith (1954) and Kindleberger (1978) hypothesized that the stock market
was intrinsically unstable and any one of the factors above could have led to the collapse
of public confidence. Fisher (1930) argued that the Smoot Hawley tariff meaningfully
contributed to the 1929 demise. Yet White (1990) showed that there is no empirical
evidence behind the tariff argument by comparing export reliant indices and import reliant
ones. He showed that stocks in these two indices declined by similar amounts after the
tariff passed. Finally, Fisher (1930) posited that the failure of Clarence Hatry’s financial
empire in September of 1929 represented the first main shock to the London stock market
which rippled over to the U.S. soon after.
Among the many reasons behind the crash lies the credit and stock market boom
hypothesis. Kindleberger (1978) argued that easy credit in the stock market played a large
role in creating the mania that led to the bubble and the inevitable bust. Figure 1 shows the
growth in loaned funds made by brokers charted against the broad stock market index from
1926 - 1931. It is clear that brokers’ loans peaked right before the 1929 crash.
White (1990) pointed out that the easy credit argument during this time period is
contradicted by tight monetary policy in the latter half of the 1920s. For example, the Fed
implemented contractionary policy in January of 1928 when it increased the discount rate
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from 3.5 to 5%.7 Hamilton (1987) argued that this constituted tight money and points out
that M1 grew insignificantly in 1929 and the CPI (consumer price index) fell.
The Federal Reserve understood that easy credit gave investors the ability to force
security prices up and create instability through speculation. In order to minimize the effect
of this, the Federal Reserve Board wanted to prevent member banks from making loans on
marginable securities to brokers who eventually made them to consumers. They did this by
threatening to close the discount window for member banks if those banks continued to
make these loans. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York disagreed with this policy
measure and reaffirmed the inability of the Fed to deny discounted assets for member
banks. Instead, it proposed raising the discount rate as the only means of curbing
speculation. However, a conflict in policy between the Board and the New York Fed
prevented rates from rising.
White, Kindleberger, and Fisher all pointed out that easy stock market credit was a
key driver in creating the mania that contributed to the market’s downfall. However, White
(1990) suggested that it is difficult to test for a bubble due to the lack of daily data and
improper previous specifications by other authors. This study aims to properly test White
(1990) and others’ primary hypothesis that it was easy stock market credit that led to the
demise in October of 1929 by using call loan rates as a proxy for the cheap borrowing costs
that enabled credit-driven speculation. It is apparent that the literature on the subject lacks
an empirical study of the changes in daily call loan rates in 1929 and their effect on stock
returns. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to conduct this analysis by not only
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estimating the effect on stock returns to see if these changes in interest rates were a
meaningful factor in the crash, but also to estimate the effect of volatility on returns.
In addition to the literature discussed above introducing the topic and the necessity
for it, there is an abundance of previous literature on the topic which mostly deals with the
effect of margin requirements on volatility. In a seminal paper, Hardouvelis (1990) started
by reasoning that the reason the Federal Reserve put into place margin requirements was
because it believed that the stock market crash of 1929 was due to credit-financed
speculation. As such, reducing the ability to buy on credit should reduce volatility and bring
stock returns to their true values. Hardouvelis (1988, 1990) found that stock values were
closer to their fundamental values in times when margin requirements were high or were
increased than when they were lower or lowered.
Figure 3 shows the relationship between margin requirements and market volatility.
The graph shows that there is some correlation between higher official margin
requirements and S&P composite volatility. Hardouvelis (1990) performed three tests, one
using a monthly measure of volatility, the other a daily, and a Vector Autoregressive
(VAR) Analysis. He found that higher margin requirements are linked with future reduced
stock return volatility, stock returns, increased trading volume on the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE), and reduced borrowing for stock purchases. Hardouvelis (1990) also
found the same results in non-turbulent periods (1934 and onwards).
Hardouvelis (1990)’s reduced form evidence from vector autoregressions showed
that while there is a negative relationship between margin requirements and volatility, this
does not imply a causation. Furthermore, the opposite relationship implying that volatility
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is a driver in changing margin requirements is not empirically supported. This is the crux
of Schwert (1988b)’s paper which contended that the observed negative relationship
between margin requirements and volatility is reflected by the idea that increases in margin
requirements seem to come after periods when stock volatility is low and vice-versa. This
policy might occur because of the observed relationship that Black (1976) pointed out:
when stock prices are high, volatility is typically low. The Fed assumes that high prices are
driven by speculation and thus curbing speculation will reduce stock prices to normal levels
which brings along higher volatility. Schwert (1988b) concluded that this finding is even
more relevant after observing that stock returns behave no differently from normal
following a year after the change in margin requirement was implemented. Thus, the
conclusion is that the Federal Reserve responds to market conditions and that these actions
have no effect on subsequent stock returns.
Hardouvelis (1990) disputed Schwert (1988b) and (Schwert 1989) by pointing out
that the inclusion of two very important control variables, the monthly real rate of return
of stocks and the growth in the ratio of margin credit to the value of the NYSE, to the
general margin requirement - volatility regression leads to the opposite findings of Schwert
(1989). Specifically, that there is no relationship between changes in volatility and margin
requirement policies but that margin requirement policies do in fact reduce volatility of
returns.
Hardouvelis (1989)’s explanation for Schwert (1988b and 1989)’s results is that
because high stock returns negatively affect volatility and positively affect margin
requirements, the negative volatility - margin requirement relationship is actually due to
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high stock returns triggering higher margin requirements, not low volatility triggering
higher margin requirements and vice versa. I run the opposite test which looks at how
volatility effects margin requirements. In short, according to Hardouvelis (1989), low
volatility does not drive high margin requirements as Schwert (1989) suggested, but rather
the observed negative correlation is actually due to increased stock returns triggering
higher margin requirements as a means to bring prices down to their fair values which will
increase volatility since prices are lower. Hardouvelis concluded by empirically testing the
effects of increased margin requirements on excess volatility and found that excess
volatility is higher during periods of low margin requirements. This finding held for postdepression periods as well.
Hardouvelis and Peristiani (1992) contributed to the literature by investigating
whether the negative relationship between margin requirements and volatility exists in
Japan on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). The reason this analysis is important is that
empirical research in the U.S is constrained due to margin requirements only changing 22
times between 1934 when the SEC gave the Fed the power to change margin requirements
and 1992 when Hardouvelis and Peristiani (1992) was written. The Tokyo Stock Exchange
(TSE) is particularly useful for this sort of analysis because the exchange has changed the
margin requirement over 100 times since Japanese margin regulation was put into place in
1951. 8
The authors focus on establishing a 24 day investment period for their empirical
analysis of the relationship between margin requirements and stock returns. They run a

8

Tokyo Stock Exchange Fact Book (1989)
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regression of returns over the 24 day period on the change in margin requirement preceding
this 24 day period. The authors found a statistically significant negative coefficient on the
margin rate change variable. The TSE breaks stocks into two sections. This result was
found for the first section. In order to determine some measure of causality, the authors
performed this analysis on the Second Section of the TSE. The stocks in this Second
Section are not allowed to be bought on margin. As such, a causal relationship would imply
a stronger effect of margin requirements on marginable securities in the First Section as
opposed to the non-marginable ones in the Second.
Hardouvelis and Peristiani (1992) found that while the growth of stock prices in
the Second Section of the TSE is negatively related to the change in margin requirements,
the correlation between the two variables is materially weaker, implying a stronger
foothold for the negative stock price-margin requirement hypothesis. Furthermore, the
authors rejected the null that both coefficients on margin requirements between Section
One and Section Two are the same, implying that the returns reaction to margin
requirements are most definitely different when comparing the two indices. The authors
solidified this result by performing the same analysis on a daily frequency, instead a weekly
one as done in the prior section. Figure 4 by Hardouvelis and Peristiani (1992) shows the
immediate growth in stock prices of the First Section and a far weaker and negative reaction
to the Second Section.
Hardouvelis and Peristiani (1992) also tested what relationship margin
requirements have on volatility. They found that when a control variable for stock returns
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is included in the regression, the negative relationship between margin requirements and
volatility becomes statistically significant and material.
The next paper which established strong precedent to ignore the findings of
Hardouvelis (1988, 1990) was Hsieh and Miller (1990). The authors started by contending
that curtailing volatility might not be a good thing because volatility represents the faster
incorporation of new information in market prices of securities. They also pointed out that
from 1974 to 1990, the Fed had not changed margin requirements because of the view that
the impact of these requirements is miniscule.
Specifically, during 1929 and the peak of the boom, total stock market credit did
not exceed more than 10% of the market value of traded equities and by 1974, the number
dropped to 2%. 9 Hsieh and Miller (1990) tested for the negative relationship between
margin requirements and volatility by looking at the 22 historical changes in the
requirement and the effects of volatility following these changes. They looked at both short
term and long term effects of a policy decision to raise or dampen requirements.
For the short term, the authors looked at whether standard deviation changes from
what it was 25 days before the margin requirement change to 25 days after the change.
They found very few statistically significant changes in the short term. Specifically, out of
the 22 changes in the requirement, only 1 of them showed a statistically significant increase
in volatility as margin requirements were decreased which is what we would expect in this
sort of specification. The other 2 significant occasions showed that volatility declined when

9

Brady Commission Report, Appendix VIII, esp. p. VIII-2
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margin requirements declined, a finding that proves counterintuitive to the initial negative
requirement - volatility hypothesis.
In the long term, the authors used monthly real returns of the S&P 500 rather than
daily returns and the associated standard deviations. They found that across the 22 changes
in margin requirements tested, there is a weakly negative relationship between standard
deviations and margin requirements but that the Levene statistics do not materially and
significantly differ between high margin periods and low margin periods. 10 In explaining
their results, which are contradictory to Hardouvelis (1990), Hsieh and Miller (1990)
argued that Hardouvelis (1990)’s negative correlation finding is incorrect because of the
technical specifications of his model. More specifically. Hardouvelis used the wrong proxy
for stock market volatility, implemented an incorrect specification for the time series
relationship between margin requirements and volatility, and erroneously set up his
multiple regression as it relates to the macroeconomic variables included.
Kupiec (1989)’s analysis of initial margin requirements and stock return volatility
also set the precedent for further criticism of Hardouvelis (1988, 1990)’s work. Kupiec’s
main contribution was the usage of a more appropriate measure of volatility. He used a
GARCH in Mean model to estimate daily volatility. Kupiec argued that Hardouvelis’
simple measure of a 12 month moving standard deviation is incorrect because it created a
misleading correlation between the variables of interest and did not account for the excess
kurtosis of stock returns as well as the time dependent conditional variances of auto
correlated and moving average components. Furthermore, a GARCH model accounts for

10

Levene Howard (1960)’s “Levene Statistic” is an inferential statistic used to test the statistical difference
between population variances of two or more groups
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an equilibrium model of asset returns by relating non diversifiable risk to conditional
expected excess of the risk free rate returns.
The primary advantage of the GARCH as it relates to the estimate of volatility is
its ability to deal with the non-stationarity of the moments of a distribution. In this case,
the relevant 2nd moment, variance as manifested by volatility, moves around and is high in
the late 1920s. The results of the GARCH specification show that there exists no
statistically significant relationship between margin requirements and excess return
volatility. These findings are consistent with Schwert (1988). The other important finding
is that the GARCH in Mean specification that Kupiec (1989) ran yielded a 20% less volatile
(as measured by standard deviation) data series than the one obtained by Hardouvelis
(1988a, 1998b) which used a 12 month moving standard deviation estimate. This result
comes from the ability of the GARCH to account for short term spikes and drops in
volatility that are exhibited in Hardouvelis’ measure of volatility. In my study, I did not try
and find a relationship between margin requirements and volatility. Instead, I used
volatility as an explanatory variable to explain variation in stock returns. The test that
Kupiec (1989) ran to find a relationship between margin requirements and volatility might
also be useful in a separate paper given the use of an ARCH model in this paper to estimate
volatility.
Finally, Hardouvelis and Theodossious (2002) looked at the effect of margin
requirements on volatility in a bull market versus a bear market. Although their result that
margin requirements should be increased in bull markets to reduce speculative excess and
increased in bear markets to provide liquidity is valuable, the relevance of their paper is to

21

defend the findings of Hardouvelis (1990). Hardouvelis (1990) received criticism from
Kupiec (1989), Schwert (1989), Salinger (1989), and Hsieh and Miller (1990) for his
incorrect regression specification discussed in Granter-Newbold (1974) regarding the bias
in the use of levels and an erroneous measure of monthly volatility. Hardouvelis (2002)
started by claiming that the papers only dispute the monthly measure examined in
Hardouvelis (1990), not the daily or VAR estimate. Secondly, Hardouvelis (2002)
attempted to close the discussion about levels versus differences by showing that the use
of levels for margin requirements and not differences is justified because margin
requirements and volatility are stationary and thus the specification used to describe the
relationship between the two variables does not provide biased results. While this piece of
literature isn’t directly relevant to the topic of this paper which principally investigates the
effect of the change in call loan rates on stock returns, not volatility, this paper is important
because it tried to end the debate on the relationship between frequently discussed variables
of interest.
Overall, the literature gives mixed findings. The main takeaways are that in the
beginning of the study of the topic, the main contributions to the literature were from
Hardouvelis who empirically showed a negative margin requirement volatility relationship.
Papers after Hardouvelis improved upon his methodology and argued that the regression
specifications implemented were flawed and the results differ upon correction of this
misspecification.
What is more noteworthy and the subject of the paper going forward is that none of
the literature performed any empirical analysis of the interest rate associated with
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borrowing. Instead, the literature focused on the actual margin requirement itself which as
mentioned before, is simply a percentage which indicates how much you can have in cash
and how much you can borrow to finance your position in a security. In 1929, the margin
requirements and the call loan rates were market determined. These call loan rates are
borrowing costs and while there isn’t a definite downward trend in 1929 for call loan rates,
call loan rates were generally much lower in the second half of 1929 during the buildup to
the bubble and the subsequent crash.
The purpose of this paper as mentioned before is to determine what impact, if any,
these low borrowing costs had on the run up of prices and subsequent crash of 1929 when
accounting for daily volatility. The following sections outline the collection of data, the
specification itself, and the results of an empirical analysis missing in the existing literature.
3. Data
The difficulty in this analysis lies in the relative scarcity of the data required to
perform an empirical analysis. This is one possible explanation reason for why previous
studies have not conducted this analysis. With the exception of Fohlin (2017), there is no
literature documenting the daily call loan rates in 1929. As such, I used the historical
New York Times (NYT) in the ProQuest database to manually collect daily call loan
rates in 1929. The last close was used for empirical purposes although ProQuest has
information on data from the year prior as well as the day prior. I then filtered out
weekends and holidays. In addition, because some NYT excerpts are incompletely
scanned, missing values in the data were replaced by linear interpolations of the
preceding and subsequent data points.
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After collecting this information, I collected daily total stock returns, SMB and
HML Fama-French factor returns, and data on the risk free rate during 1929. I filtered out
the trading days on Saturday to align the data with the call loan. During this time, stock
markets traded on Saturday but call loan rates were not. In addition to total stock market
data, I also collected data on 12 industries. Industries include non-durables, durables,
manufacturing, energy, chemicals, business equipment, telecommunications, utilities,
shops, healthcare, money and other. They act as a portfolio of different securities within
these twelve categories.
The data used in my model comes both from the Ken French website and the
Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS).
4. Empirical Analysis
The goal of this paper is to determine whether the change in call loan rates affects
stock returns. Specifically, did the relatively low cost of borrowing prop up the market
and create a bubble which was inevitably going to burst? What about volatility? Do we
find a negative relationship between volatility and stock prices? Do increases in call loan
rates quell high stock returns when accounting for volatility? How does this result vary
across industries? These are the questions that I aim to answer by running regressions on
the market in addition to 12 industries to determine what effect a change in call loan rates
has on stock returns.
The primary result is how call loan rates affect the total stock market. I used the
mktrf variable which denotes the total daily stock market return less the daily risk free
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return. On the right hand side of the regression is alpha, the percentage change in daily
call loan rates, and percentage change in daily volatility.
Arriving at a precise measure of volatility was important to avoid the criticism
discussed above that Kupiec (1989) made of Hardouvelis’s (1988) paper which used a 12
month moving average of standard deviation of returns. Volatility is a statistical measure
of security price fluctuations within a given time period and is represented as the square
of the daily return series. The daily volatility is the measure of fluctuations within a day
and is calculated as the one period lag difference squared of a return series.
Overview of the GARCH and ARCH
Engle (1982) developed the ARCH model while Bollerslev (1986) created the
GARCH model. Both argued that these models were designed to deal with the
assumption of non-stationarity in financial data. Miah and Rahman (2016) highlight that
ARCH and GARCH models have become important tools for dealing with time series
heteroscedasticity by treating heteroscedasticity as a variance to be modelled. The goal of
such models is to provide a volatility measure like a standard deviation that does not
remain constant and that can be used in financial decisions.
Aktan, Korsakienė, and Smaliukiene (2011) pointed out that the magnitude of the
estimated parameters α and β describes the short-run characteristics of the resulting
volatility time series. Large GARCH lag coefficients (β) indicate that volatility is
persistent because shocks to conditional variance take a long time to die out. Large
GARCH error coefficients (α) indicate that volatility reacts strongly to market
movements, and if (α) is relatively high and (β) is relatively low, volatilities spike
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frequently in the period of interest. To get a benchmark for what is large, Alexander
(2001) shows that in financial markets it is common to estimate (β) lag coefficients based
on daily observations in excess of 0.8 and (α) error coefficients of no more than 0.2.
I use the ARCH lagged by 1 day which was derived by Engle (1982). I did not
use Bollerslev (1986) GARCH model due to the inability for the GARCH to fit market
data for 1929. The GARCH specification is outlined below. The ARCH ignores the last
term of the GARCH specification which uses previous period volatility as an input for
future volatility forecasts.
(1)

2
2
𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡2 = 𝜔𝜔 + ∑𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖=1 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖
+ ∑𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗=1 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗

Miah and Rahman (2016) described the above specification and terms as the
following: 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡2 is the conditional variance of returns, 𝜔𝜔, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 and 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 are coefficients that

2
is the residual lagged returns by
need to be estimated through this specification, and 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖
2
whatever specification is chosen. 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗
is the lagged variance. Miah and Rahman (2016)

explained that a primary challenge in financial modelling is to find the right model from a
family of models that best fits the data. The most common criteria in determining
whether a candidate model is too simple or unnecessarily complex are the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC).
AIC: T x ln(residual sum of squares – (RSS)) + 2n
BIC: T x ln(RSS) + nln(T)
T is the number of observations and n is an estimated parameter. In an analysis of 4
Bangladeshi companies, Miah and Rahman (2016) found that a (1,1) specification of the
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GARCH(p,q) is the best fit for their data. Optimally, an AIK and BIC analysis would be
done for the market data. However, given the inability for the GARCH to fit the model in
addition to an ARCH (1) yielding statistically significant coefficients for 1929, an ARCH
(1) was used to forecast volatility. The ARCH specification is therefore just the GARCH
minus the last term. The ARCH model yields a variance. As such, the square root is taken
to arrive at standard deviation. Then the value from the previous day is subtracted from
today’s value to obtain a difference which then is expressed as a percentage. This final
variable form is used for the regression.
In addition to call loan rates and volatility, the SMB and HML factors from Fama
and French (1993) were included. Eugene Fama and Ken French developed a model to
describe and explain variation in stock returns. They found that there are three main
factors which are able to explain roughly 90% of diversified portfolio returns. The first
factor is the market returns, the second is “SMB” or small-minus-big. This refers to the
observed outperformance of smaller company stocks over bigger stocks. The third main
factor is “HML” or the outperformance of companies with high book to market values
over those that have lower book to market values. This model is an expansion of the
traditional capital asset pricing model (CAPM) which uses only market risk to describe
returns and describes about 70% of the returns variation. Building upon the CAPM, Fama
and French arrived at the following specification:
(2)

𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑥𝑥 �𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 � + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑥𝑥 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑥𝑥 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + 𝜀𝜀

27

The Fama-French specification is relevant for this paper because it provides a
baseline of important variables to include to explain variation. The final two regression
specifications run on the market are below:
(3) 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑥𝑥 (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐) + 𝜀𝜀

(4) 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑥𝑥 (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐) + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑥𝑥 (𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣) + 𝜀𝜀

In addition, the regression specifications for each industry are adapted by changing the
left hand to the relevant industry less the risk free rate but retaining the market measure
of volatility. The industry specific regressions are below:
(5) 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝑖𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑥𝑥 (𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓) + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑥𝑥 (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐) + 𝜀𝜀

(6) 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝑖𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑥𝑥 (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐) + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑥𝑥 �𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 � + 𝜀𝜀
(7) 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝑖𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑥𝑥 (𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓) + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑥𝑥 (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐) + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑥𝑥 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵 +
𝛽𝛽4 𝑥𝑥 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + 𝜀𝜀

(8) 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝑖𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑥𝑥 (𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓) + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑥𝑥 (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐) +
𝛽𝛽2 𝑥𝑥 (𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣) + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑥𝑥 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝑥𝑥 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + 𝜀𝜀

After establishing the regression specification, STATA was used to carry out the analysis.
Data was created in a CSV and imported into STATA. The results are discussed below.
5. Results
Table 1 highlights the major results from this study. The first two regressions (3),
(4) which are the main results of this paper look at the change in call loan rates on excess
market returns in 1929. The second version of this regression includes the measure of
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volatility. I found that the coefficient on calldiffpct, the variable which describes the daily
percentage change on call loan rates, to be -1.653 without the inclusion of volatility and
-1.609 upon the introduction of volatility into the regression. All three coefficients are
statistically significant with the two coefficients on the call loan rate being significant at
the 5% level while the one on volatility at the 1% level. Therefore, a one standard
deviation move in the call loan rate of 0.18% implies a 0.30% drop in daily stock returns.
After including volatility, this drop in stock returns becomes 0.29%. This shows that a
part of the drop in stock returns in attributable to volatility but not much. A one standard
deviation change in daily volatility of 0.60% reduces daily stock returns by 0.37%. This
confirms Black (1976)’s finding that volatility and stock returns are inversely related.
The adjusted R2 is low at 1.4% without volatility and 3.9% with volatility. Although this
is not technically a margin requirement in the traditional sense, the call loan rate implies a
constraint on borrowing which when increased, reduces stock market returns.
The next specification run (5) was excess industry returns on excess market
returns and the call loan rate variable. I found that the only industry with a significant
coefficient was manufacturing with a value of -0.449 with significance at the 5% level. A
one standard deviation move of 0.18% in call loan rates implies a 0.08% move in daily
manufacturing returns. After including volatility in the specification (6), manufacturing is
the only industry that remains statistically significant and negative when observing the
effect of call loan rates on returns. Manufacturing, business equipment, shops, health,
money and other all had statistically significant coefficients on the volatility variable.
Shops, health, money, and other all had negative coefficients on volatility while
manufacturing and business equipment had positive relationships with volatility.
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Regression specification (7) looks at the effect on excess industry returns from the
excess market returns, call loan rates, and SMB and HML. Upon the inclusion of the
Fama-French factors, manufacturing returns and call loan rates exhibited a negative
association while call loan rates and health exhibited a positive relationship. Both
relationships were statistically significant with a coefficient on call loan rates for
manufacturing of -0.400 and 0.889 for health. This implies that a one standard deviation
move in call loan rates implies a reduction in daily manufacturing stock returns of
0.072% and a 0.16% increase in daily health stock returns.
Finally, in regression specification (8), I looked at the effect of excess market
returns, call loan rates, volatility, SMB, and HML on industry stock returns. I found that
manufacturing has a -0.362 coefficient on the call loan rate variable and a 0.253
coefficient on the volatility variable. The call loan rate was statistically significant at the
5% level and the volatility at the 1% level. Money also had a statistically significant
result on volatility with a coefficient of -0.229 at the 5% level.
In order to understand why these results might persist both on the returns and
volatility side, a potential approach might look at trading volumes on margin for specific
industries to see if these industries that had statistically significant results were also
industries that had high margin trading volume. This might lead to a better understanding
of which industries are more sensitive to higher interest rates.
Furthermore, it is reasonable to have found that not all industries exhibit a
negative relationship between call loan rates and stock returns or volatility and stock
returns. Average cumulative alpha of all industries must sum to roughly 1 since those
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industries make up the total market. Thus, some industries are bound to do better than
others and worse than others. In addition, their sensitivity to call loan rates varies based
on the proportion of trades placed on margin for that industry. This explanation extends
to volatility in that on average, the market falls with increases in volatility, but some
industries fall less than others and this result changes depending on what time horizon is
observed.
What is noteworthy is that results for industries show that manufacturing tends to
be consistently sensitive to changes in margin requirements which would imply that
manufacturing stocks might be bought more on margin than chemicals for example.
Overall, the main result of interest falls in line with the hypothesis that increases in call
loan rates reduce stock returns in 1929 when controlling for the relevant variables.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
White (1990) aptly pointed out the real possibility that low call loan rates could
have been responsible for the Great Depression and crash that is so frequently written
about. However, before and after White’s paper, others in the literature have focused
mainly on the effect of a margin requirement on stock returns and volatility. Hardouvelis
initially posited that margin requirements are reactionary measures which the Fed uses to
curtail volatility and temper inflated stock returns. However, authors after him such as
Hsieh and Miller (1990) pointed out the flaws in his test design and showed that margin
requirement changes follow changes in stock prices rather than lead them. They also
showed that there is no statistically significant change in stock prices when the Federal
Reserve changes the margin requirement.
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While the existing literature is important for the impact of holding little cash to
finance a large position, it does not speak to the impact of having a low cost of borrowing.
The purpose of this paper was to investigate this issue, specifically in 1929 when the call
loan rate was not set by the Federal Reserve. This has interesting implications because the
rate was significantly lower during this time partially because it was market determined.
What impact did this have on overall returns? According to the empirical analysis presented
in this paper, the low rates contributed meaningfully to the inflated prices that eventually
resulted in the October crash. This is accounting for volatility which is also shown to be
negatively correlated with returns.
However, this result did not hold for most industries. Does this mean that one can
avoid the negative impacts of a potential change in call loan rates by just investing in
specific industries? Perhaps. But in 1929, this was tough considering the large drop in the
entire stock market. What does this trend say about potential trading strategies, a future
topic to be investigated in relation to this paper? One could conceivably create options on
potential reactions in the market to changes in call loan rates by going long on industries
that are less affected by call loan rates and go short the ones that are more affected
(manufacturing, healthcare, or even the entire market). Or in a more general sense, can one
make bets about how the market will do if they for see a change in Federal Reserve policy
on the horizon? According to previous papers on this subject, none of these anomalies
should exist when looking at a strict change in margin requirements. But it is unclear what
happens in regards to changes in the call loan rate.
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A completely separate paper replicating the studies of previous papers which
looked at the 23 changes in margin requirements since the Fed was given that ability until
the time of the paper being published could be replicated for large changes in call loan
rates. Furthermore, this study could be replicated for different periods to see if the result
still persists. This result as of now is specific to just 1929 because of the unique nature of
how the rate was set, how low it was relative to today, and the obvious crash in October.
This study could be a valuable tool in driving Federal Reserve policy for the future and
shape the way that investors think about trading on margin.
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7. Appendix
Figure 1: Stock Prices and Broker Loans from 1926 – 1931 11

11

Figure taken from White (1990) paper. Data not readily available for chart recreation.

34

Figure 2: Interest Rates from 1926 – 1931

12

12

Figure taken from White (1990) paper. Data not readily available for chart recreation.
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Figure 3: Official Margin Requirements vs. S&P Composite Volatility 13

13

Graph taken from Hardouvelis (1990). Data not readily available for recreation.

36

Figure 4: Margin Decrease vs. Stock Price Reaction 14

14

Taken from Hardouvelis and Peristiani (1992). Data not readily available for graph reconstruction.
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Figure 5: Call Loan Rates in 1929

Table 2: Call Loan Rate Changes on Market and Industry Returns
Following econometric specifications (2) through (7), in this Table I show primarily the estimated effects of the change in daily call loan rates in percent on market excess returns. I control for market
excess returns, daily volatility as measured by an ARCH (1), the Fama-French SMB and HMl factors for explaining returns, and alpha. Security market data was hand collected at a daily frequency from
Ken French’s website and CRSP. Security returns are value weighted historical returns of all stocks listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ for which complete data exists. Daily call loan rate data
was found in the historical New York Times on the ProQuest database from January 1929 - December 1929. An ARCH (1) model was estimated using daily returns on excess market returns in 1929 and
used to calculate daily volatility. Columns 1 and 2 indicate excess market returns as the dependent variable, while columns 2-49 are excess industry returns used for the six specifications mentioned
earlier in the paper. The independent variables are listed on the left hand horizontal axis. Excess market returns are only used as a control in industry specific regressions. P-values: *10%, ** 5%, ***1%.

Dependent
Variable:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Mkt-Rf

Mkt-Rf

Non-Durables
- Rf

Durables - Rf

Manufacturing
- Rf

Energy - Rf

Chemicals - Rf

Business
Equipment - Rf

0.756***

1.191***

0.961***

0.826***

1.313***

1.383***

(0.014)

(0.035)

(0.015)

(0.029)

(0.028)

(0.030)

Market - Rf

Call Loan Rate
Difference in

-1.654**

-1.610**

-0.092

0.222

-0.450**

-0.197

0.378

-0.411

(0.759)

(0.749)

(0.177)

(0.426)

(0.178)

(0.346)

(0.343)

(0.366)

-0.614***

Volatility
Difference in

(0.226)
SMB

HML

Alpha

Adjusted R2

-0.059

0.001

-0.017

-0.148

.0195

-0.006

0.131

0.172**

(0.137)

(0.137)

(0.031)

(0.076)

(0.032)

(0.062)

(0.061)**

(0.065)

0.014

0.039

0.915

0.822

0.946

0.773

0.896

0.894
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Dependent
Variable:
Market - Rf

Call Loan Rate
Difference in
%

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

(13)

(14)

(15)

(16)

Telecom - Rf

Utilities - Rf

Shops - Rf

Health - Rf

Money - Rf

Other - Rf

Non-Durables Rf

Durables - Rf

0.866***

1.268***

0.952***

0.843***

1.366***

0.651***

0.751***

1.190***

(0.033)

(0.029)

(0.022)

(0.032)

(0.026)

(0.168)

(.014)

(0.036)

0.043

0.286

0.008

0.548

0.432

-0.094

-0.092

0.222

(0.401)

(0.344)

(0.271)

(0.393)

(0.314)

(0.203)

(0.176)

(0.426)

0.104

0.053

(0.053)

(0.129)

Volatility
Difference in
%

SMB

HML

Alpha

Adjusted R2

0.094

0.163***

-0.125**

-0.016

-0.010

0.0175

-0.007

-0.153**

(0.072)

(0.062)

(0.049)

(0.071)

(0.056)

(0.0364)

(0.032)

(0.077)

0.733

0.889

0.880

0.729

0.918

0.860

0.916

0.821
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(17)

(18)

(19)

(20)

(21)

(21)

(22)

(23)

Dependent
Variable:

Manufacturing
- Rf

Energy - Rf

Chemicals - Rf

Business
Equipment - Rf

Telecom - Rf

Utilities - Rf

Shops - Rf

Health - Rf

Market - Rf

0.971***

0.825***

1.310***

1.395***

0.875***

1.274***

0.942***

0.819***

(0.014)

(0.029)

(0.029)

(0.030)

(0.033)

(0.028)

(0.022)

(0.031)

-0.448***

-0.197

0.377

0.412

0.434

0.286

0.006

0.544

(0.172)

(0.346)

(0.344)

(0.363)

(0.399)

(0.343)

(0.267)

(0.379)

0.213***

0.001

-0.063

0.252**

0.195*

0.115

-0.216

-0.508***

(0.052)

(0.105)

(0.104)

(0.110)

(0.121)

(0.104)

(0.081)

(0.115)

-0.001

-0.006

0.137

0.147**

0.075

0.152**

-0.104

0.032

(0.031)

(0.063)

(0.063)

(0.065)

(0.0726)

(0.062)

(0.048)

(0.068)

0.737

0.772

0.895

0.895

0.734

0.889

0.884

0.751

Call Loan Rate
Difference in
%

Volatility
Difference in
%

SMB

HML

Constant

Adjusted R2
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Dependent
Variable:
Market - Rf

Call Loan Rate
Difference in
%

Volatility
Difference in
%

(24)

(25)

(26)

(27)

(28)

(29)

(30)

(31)

Money - Rf

Other - Rf

Non-Durables
- Rf

Durables - Rf

Manufacturing
- Rf

Energy - Rf

Chemicals - Rf

Business
Equipment - Rf

1.349***

0.645***

.7839***

1.091***

.982***

.965***

1.222***

1.215***

(0.025)

(0.016)

(0.019)

(0.048)

(0.020)

(0.038)

(0.039)

(0.039)

0.430

-0.095

-.002

-0.030

-0.400**

0.136

0.155

-0.018

(0.306)

(0.201)

(0.166)

(0.426)

(0.181)

(0.336)

(0.344)

(0.341)

-0.338***

-0.129**

(0.092)

(0.061)
0.225***

-0.238

0.007

0.152**

-0.140**

-0.427***

(0.034)

(0.087)

(0.037)

(0.068)

(0.070)

(0.069)

-0.050

-0.301***

0.103*

0.579***

-0.345***

-0.491***

(0.059)

(0.151)

(0.064)

(0.119)

(0.122)

(0.121)

SMB

HML

Constant

Adjusted R2

0.021

0.029

0.018

-0.182**

0.019

.010

0.113*

0.110

(0.055)

(0.036)

(0.029)

(0.076)

(0.032)

(0.060)

(0.061)

(0.061)

0.923

0.862

0.928

0.828

0.946

0.794

0.899

0.911
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Dependent
Variable:
Market - Rf

Call Loan Rate
Difference in
%

(32)

(33)

(34)

(35)

(36)

(37)

(38)

(39)

Telecom - Rf

Utilities - Rf

Shops - Rf

Health - Rf

Money - Rf

Other - Rf

Non-Durables Rf

Durables - Rf

0.728***

1.151***

1.002***

0.959***

1.374***

0.754***

0.786***

1.082***

(0.041)

(0.038)

(0.027)

(0.959)

(0.035)

(0.021)

(0.019)

(0.050)

0.047

0.007

0.171

0.889**

0.481*

0.162

0.000

-0.043

(0.358)

(0.339)

(0.238)

(0.356)

(0.307)

(0.163)

(0.166)

(0.427)

0.021

-0.089

(0.053)

(0.136)

Volatility
Difference in
%

SMB

HML

Constant

Adjusted R2

-0.636***

-0.128*

0.437***

0.601***

0.261***

0.201***

0.230***

-0.261**

(0.073)

(0.069)

(0.048)

(0.072)

(0.062)

(0.038)

(0.036)

(0.094)

-0.158

-0.483***

-0.118

0.077

-0.179*

0.352***

-0.049

-0.305**

(0.127)

(0.120)

(0.084)

(0.126)

(0.109)

(0.067)

(0.059)

(0.152)

-0.004

0.148**

-0.054

0.077

0.032

0.045

0.017

0.177**

(0.064)

(0.060)

(0.042)

(0.063)

(0.055)

(0.033)

(0.029)

(0.076)

0.794

0.896

0.910

0.786

0.924

0.883

0.928

0.828
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Dependent
Variable:
Market - Rf

Call Loan Rate
Difference in
%

Volatility
Difference in
%

SMB

HML

Constant

Adjusted R2

(40)

(41)

(42)

(43)

(44)

(45)

(46)

(47)

Manufacturing
- Rf

Energy - Rf

Chemicals - Rf

Business
Equipment - Rf

Telecom - Rf

Utilities - Rf

Shops - Rf

Health - Rf

1.007***

0.975***

1.206***

1.217***

0.710***

1.157***

1.005***

0.938***

(0.020)

(0.040)

(0.040)

(0.040)

(0.042)

(0.040)

(0.028)

(0.042)

-0.361**

0.151

0.130

-0.015

0.021

0.015

0.174

0.847**

(0.174)

(0.336)

(0.344)

(0.342)

(0.358)

(0.340)

(0.239)

(0.354)

0.252***

0.098

-0.162

0.023

-0.174

0.052

0.023

-0.211*

(0.055)

(0.107)

(0.110)

(0.109)

(0.114)

(0.109)

(0.076)

(0.113)

0.072*

0.178**

-0.181

-0.421***

-0.680***

-0.115

0.443

0.547***

(0.038)

(0.074)

(0.075)

(0.075)

(0.078)

(0.074)

(0.052)

(0.078)

0.114*

0.583***

-0.352

-0.490***

-0.166

-0.481***

-0.117

0.068

(0.062)

(0.119)

(0.122)

(0.121)

(0.127)

(0.121)

(0.085)

(0.126)

0.005

-0 .005

0.122

0.108*

0.005

0.145**

-0.056

0.089

(0.031)

(0.060)

(0.061)

(0.061)

(0.064)

(0.061)

(0.043)

(0.063)

0.950

0.793

0.900

0.910

0.795

0.896

0.910

0.788
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Dependent
Variable:
Market - Rf

Call Loan Rate
Difference in
%

Volatility
Difference in
%

SMB

HML

Constant

Adjusted R2

(48)

(49)

Money - Rf

Other - Rf

1.351***

0.752***

(0.036)

(0.022)

0.446

0.158

(0.305)

(0.189)

-0.229**

-0.023

(0.097)

(0.060)

0.202***

0.195***

(0.067)

(0.041)

-0.189*

0.351***

(0.108)

(0.067)

0.045

0.046

(0.054)

(0.034)

0.925

0.882
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